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VENUE PROBLEMS IN WISCONSIN
In 1856, only eight years after Wisconsin achieved statehood,
the Legislature adopted the Field Code of Civil Procedure. The
venue provisions of the Code have remained substantially un-
changed since that time. The basic venues available to a plaintiff
commencing an action remain the same as those in the original
Code: (1) where the subject of action is situated; (2) where the
cause of action arises; or (3) where the defendant resides (or is
doing business). In this period of time, one would expect that any
problems in the application of the venue statute would have been
resolved long ago; nevertheless, such problems still arise.
A survey of the historical background of venue in England and
the United States, followed by a review of some Wisconsin cases
in which plaintiffs experienced difficulty in laying proper venue,
may cast light on the present law in Wisconsin and on the reasons
why this area of the law is not always clear.
I. ENGLISH BACKGROUND
The original meaning of "venue" in the English law was the
neighborhood from which the jurors were required to be drawn
because their personal knowledge of the facts and the parties
formed the bases for decision, regardless of whether the case in-
volved title to land, trespass, fraud, debt, detinue, or any other
action at law.' This use of a jury of 12 local men, or "recognitors",
had been thoroughly established by 1200 A.D., in the courts of
assize which travelled on a circuit and were primarily concerned
with questions of seisin. When the three branches of the law courts
settled at Westminster about 1200 A.D., in order to avoid the
inconvenience of travelling and transporting records and equip-
ment, the convenience then considered was that of the courts,
rather than that of parties or witnesses. However, the fact that the
courts were established at Westminster did not necessarily mean
that a case would be tried there. In fact, after the Statute of West-
minster in 1285 authorized the courts of Nisi Prius to try cases of
I. See generally 92 C.J.S. Venue §§ 2, 3; and Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48
MicH. L. REv. 1 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Blume].
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trespass "and other pleas pleaded in either of the benches,"'2 there
were two possible places of trial. Under this procedure, actions
were commenced, for instance, in King's Bench at Westminster
and there pleaded to issue; then a writ would issue commanding
the sheriff of the county where the land lay or the cause of action
arose to summon jurors from that locality to Westminster to try
the case on their own knowledge. Such was the procedure "unless
before ' 3 then the circuit court of assize arrived in the locality,
whereupon the case could be tried without the necessity of the
jurors going to Westminster. After trial by the circuit court in the
neighborhood, the verdict of the jury would be returned to West-
minster where judgment would be rendered by the court in which
the action had been commenced. This was an obviously superior
method, serving the convenience of the jurors, the parties, and the
courts.
The necessity of using jurors from the neighborhood in which
the claim arose gradually decreased over the years, as proof by
witnesses superseded proof by jurors. As late as 1470, however, the
plaintiff had to "lay" his action in the county where the claim
arose, even if the action were one that would now be called transi-
tory.' If an allegation of breach of contract was made, for example,
and the defendant denied the breach, the jurors had to be drawn
from the locality where the breach allegedly occurred; if new mat-
ter in the nature of confession and avoidance were raised by the
defendant, the jurors had to be drawn from the locality of the new
matter raised. Yet, by 1705, the requirement of local jurors was
dropped in most personal actions at law, and even earlier, in 1664-
1665, statutes provided that no judgment was void for improper
venue if timely objection were not made.5
Despite the changing role of the jury, the requirement that
venue in the real actions and in certain personal actions be laid in
the place where the land was situated or the cause of action arose
2. Blume at 7.
3. The name of these circuit courts, "Nisi Prius", was derived from the language of the
writ, which may be translated "unless before".
4. Actions were divided into two categories. "Local" actions were those so closely
connected with the place in which they arose that it was held that they could only have arisen
there. Included in this group were real actions, ejectment, trespass to land, and replevin.
The "transitory" actions were those not identified with any particular locus, that is, those
which could arise anywhere, such as actions on contracts, debts, and most torts. See 92
C.J.S. Venue §§ 3, 4, 7-9, 26 and 27.
5. Blume at 18.
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continued because the practice worked well. In the real actions, the
court had jurisdiction over the land; summons could be served by
the sheriff of that county on the land; and judgment could be
executed there. Equally, in ejectment or replevin actions, all the
necessary steps could be taken within the county where the prop-
erty, real or personal, was located. In all these cases, witnesses
were also likely to be found nearby.
In personal actions at law, the object of service of process was
to force the defendant to appear so that he would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court, since default judgments were not permissi-
ble prior to 1725. The summons was issued and property belonging
to the defendant was attached simultaneously. If the defendant did
not appear, successive attachments of the defendant's property
within the county followed, until he was forced to appear. If attach-
ments did not achieve this goal, writs of capias could issue to the
sheriffs of any county in which the defendant was thought to be,
followed by outlawry6 as a last resort, so that the defendant would
be likely to appear and defend the action, rather than to forfeit all
his possessions within the realm.
As the distinction between local and transitory actions devel-
oped, the personal actions of debt, account, case and covenant were
no longer tied to the locality where the cause of action arose.
Instead, these actions could follow the person of the defendant.
This meant that venue could be laid where the defendant was found
or where he had chattels out of which a judgment could be satis-
fied. For such purposes, the so-called "venue of the margin" was
used. This legal fiction allowed the plaintiff to claim that the cause
of action arose in a county where a judgment could be satisfied and
the courts held that this fiction could not be denied in actions which
could have arisen in any county. The fictional margin-venue could
still be denied in actions tied to a locality, such as ejectment,
trespass quare clausum fregit, replevin, and, in general, actions
substantially in rem against real estate. However, when writs of
capias and outlawry became available against an absent defen-
6. Originally, outlawry was limited to those fleeing from criminal charges; the outlaw
was considered beyond the King's peace and protection, forfeited all his property, and could
be slain by anyone who came upon him. 3 HoLDswoRTH's HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW at
605. Courts later adopted this practice, in milder form, to deal with absconding defendants.
The defendant was summoned by proclamation to five successive county courts; if he failed
to appear, all his goods and chattels were declared forfeited. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 1620, n. 30 at 932.
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dant,7 the plaintiff was once again required to lay venue where the
cause of action arose, apparently on the basis of fairness to the
defendant.' In actions involving real property, the land was already
under the court's jurisdiction, so the service of summons as a
means of giving notice to the defendant was a mere formality.
Valid service was effected if the summons was left on the land, even
if there was little or no likelihood of the defendant being there or
being informed of the summons.
Thus, it appears that, in actions at law, determination of the
proper venue was affected by a number of factors, including con-
venience, reach of process, the nature of the action (local or transi-
tory), and the type of jurisdiction needed (in personam or in rem)
in order for a judgment to be enforceable.
Courts of equity developed a number of different rules, due
primarily to the different basis of authority and mode of operation
peculiar to such Chancery courts. Chancery was originally a sort
of public board or office which issued writs; subsequently, about
1238, it developed into a separate court, and soon thereafter was
settled at Westminister. Its essentially religious nature was appar-
ent: its judicial officers were clergy; its decrees were to act on the
conscience of the person; decisions were based on information
given by witnesses on oath; and equity would not aid a plaintiff
unless the Chancellor decided that, ex aequo et bono, the plaintiff
was free of guilt and deserved the court's assistance against the
defendant-wrongdoer. Since no jury was employed, there was no
need to lay venue in any particular place for purposes of juror
selection. Chancery sat only at Westminster; yet, since its process,
the subpoena, ran throughout the realm, difficulty was rarely expe-
rienced in acquiring personal jurisdiction over a defendant regard-
less of where he might be found. Before 1732, if a defendant was
abroad or in hiding and therefore could not be served with
subpoena, no decree could issue. At this time, however, a form of
service by publication was developed, requiring posted notices in
the parish church of the defendant's usual abode and a showing
that he had been in England within the past two years. Then the
bill would be taken as confessed and a personal judgment against
the absent defendant would be given, which the plaintiff was al-
7. Capias and outlawry were first used in about 1250 in an action for trespass; they
became available in the other forms of action over a period of nearly 300 years. The process
was complete by about 1531. Blume at 12.
8. Blume at 24.
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lowed to satisfy from any real or personal property of the defen-
dant within the country.
Backed by the authority of the Church and the acquisition of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the usual mode of opera-
tion of courts of equity was through a decree which operated in
personam, compelling the party to act or to refrain from acting.
In cases requiring delivery of possession of land, the court would
issue a writ to the sheriff of the county in which the land was
located, directing him to assist the plaintiff in taking possession.
It is therefore apparent that venue, in the modern sense of the
word, was not a consideration in suits in equity.
In summary, the following were bases for laying venue: (1)
where the cause of action arose, originally because of the need for
personal knowledge of the facts by the jurors, and retained because
of the likelihood that parties, witnesses, and any property involved
would be located there; (2) where the land was situated, in actions
involving real property, in order for a judgment in rem to be en-
forceable; or (3) where the defendant resided or could be found,
either in order to subject him to the court's jurisdiction through
service of process or to increase the probability of his having prop-
erty within that jurisdiction out of which a judgment might be
satisfied. The defendant could obtain a change of venue in "transi-
tory actions", such as covenant or debt, as a matter of course only
if he could show that the cause of action arose wholly in a county
other than that in which venue had been laid. In 1803, Lord Ellen-
borough stated that, in balancing inconveniences (primarily to wit-
nesses), the court should interfere with the plaintiff's choice only
if "all the convenience and justice of the case preponderates in
favour of the application". 9 In local actions, of course, there was
no possibility of change of venue once it had been properly laid. If
a "local action" was brought in the wrong county, timely objection
could cause its removal to the proper county; without objection,
an enforceable personal judgment might still be obtained since the
defendant's appearance gave the court personal jurisdiction, even
though subject-matter jurisdiction over any real property may have
been lacking.
II. AMERICAN BACKGROUND
In establishing the federal judicial system in the United States
9. K.B., 1803, Holmes v. Wainwright, 3 East 329, 330, 102 Eng. Rep. 624 (1803).
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after the American Revolution, 0 the English system which was
familiar to the colonists was retained in large part. However, cer-
tain changes were made, due to the fears and prejudices experi-
enced in the colonies as a result of that system. The separation of
law and equity was maintained, and the courts of equity were to
follow the rules and procedures of those in England. The Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789 divided the nation into thirteen districts,
each composed of circuits. Courts were established in each circuit
which were to sit at specified times and places. The office of United
States Marshall for each district was created, with duties similar
to those of the Sheriff in each county in England. Process ran only
within the district in civil actions. Therefore, only if a defendant
was a resident of that district or could be found within the district
at the time of service could he be served with process issued within
such district. Insofar as procedure was concerned, the law courts
in a district were to be governed by the practices obtaining in the
state courts of that district. Although the federal courts were given
the power to change procedures so that they did not conform with
state practice, this authority was rarely exercised. Civil actions at
law were totally confined to the district in which the action was
brought; service of process, pleadings, trial to judgment and execu-
tion of that judgment had to be within the district, and all parties,
witnesses, and jurors had to be summoned therein."
One major change, in both the new federal and state systems,
was to emphasize the protection of the defendant's interests in
laying venue.'2 The colonists were acutely aware of the unfairness
which could result to a defendant if venue were laid in a distant
place; the size of the country and the difficulties and dangers at-
tending travel were all too apparent. Accordingly, the primary
basis for venue was the residence of the defendant; other possible
venues were, generally speaking, exceptions to this rule. The same
considerations of fairness and convenience to defendants were also
fundamental reasons for the establishment of the circuit courts
within the districts. Indeed, the people of what is now Kentucky
threatened to leave the Union unless provided with a court in their
area. 3 The distinction between local and transitory actions'4 was
10. See Blume 29-34, and Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Warren].
11. Blume; Warren, supra note 10.
12. Warren at 72.
13. Blume at 36.
14. See note 4 supra.
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maintained, however, and thus modified the primary venue (the
defendant's residence) for those actions traditionally held to be
local-replevin, trespass to land, and those actions involving title
or possession of real property.
The judicial systems of the individual states varied widely.
Most included separate courts of law and equity, although Penn-
sylvania, greatly influenced by the people's hatred for the courts
of equity which had been instruments of the King and administered
by royal appointees during colonial times, established no equity
system at all and instead allowed its law courts more latitude in
hearing and granting relief in cases which would have been consid-
ered of equitable cognizance. The northern states, in particular,
emphasized the importance of juries, due to their basic distrust of
judges which carried over from pre-Revolutionary days.
Some modifications of the original provisions regarding the
Federal Court system have been made over the years, in attempts
to improve its efficacy and efficiency as certain problems became
apparent. For instance, the strict confinement of civil actions at
law to the territorial limits of a district has been somewhat relaxed
in that service of process may now be made in any district within
a state having more than one district.1 5 A statute enacted in 187511
allowed extra-district service of process in order to give notice to
non-resident property-owners of actions in rem or quasi in rem
within the district which might result in a judgment to be satisfied
by execution on that property. Other statutes have made excep-
tions to the territorial limitations on service of process in certain
types of actions, such as stockholders' derivative suits and bills of
interpleader. 17 Nevertheless, the situation in the well-known case
of Livingston v. Jefferson1 would still hold true today, that is, a
personal judgment could not be recovered against a non-resident
defendant in a local action unless the defendant "could be served"
within the district or state where the land involved is located. Local
actions, 9 thus, may still be laid only where the property is located.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (1938). Previously, minor exceptions had been made, allowing
extra-district writs of execution in cases where the United States sought to satisfy a judg-
ment it had obtained (Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 6, 1 Stat. 515); in 1826, this was
extended so that any plaintiff could get execution in another district, but only if both
districts were within a single state (Act of May 20, 1826, ch. 124, 4 Stat. 184).
16. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 8, 18 Stat. 472.
17. Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1695, 2361 (1948).
18. 15 F. Cas. 660 (No. 8,411) (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
19. See note 4 supra.
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In federal practice, venue in transitory actions is affected by the
reach of process and by the basis for federal jurisdiction. Thus, in
diversity cases, venue is proper only in a district in which all defen-
dants or all plaintiffs reside or in which the claim arose; whereas,
in non-diversity cases, the possible venues available are the district
in which all defendants reside or in which the claim arose. 20
The American Law Institute has proposed that revisions be
made to these venue statutes, in order to remedy certain defects.
The changes with regard to venue in diversity cases are aimed
primarily at inhibiting "forum-shopping", 1 by forbidding a plain-
tiff to bring a diversity action in a federal court located in his home
state. He is thus encouraged to resort to the state court system of
his domicile, rather than to seek a federal forum. The Reporters
have indicated that this provision is to be made a matter of jurisdic-
tion rather than of venue, in order that a defect may not be waiva-
ble.22 In accord with this line of reasoning, the "residence" of a
corporate defendant is limited to (1) the district in which it has its
principal place of business, or (2) the districts within any state in
which it is incorporated, if its principal office is located in a differ-
ent state. This change is needed, in view of the denial of access to
federal courts in the plaintiff's home state, in order to prevent the
further forum-shopping which might result from retention of the
"doing-business" standard as a test of a corporation's residence?23
On the other hand, the possibility of laying venue "where the claim
arose" is broadened under the proposed section 1303 to include
districts wherein ". . a substantialpart of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantialpart of property
which is the subject of the action is situated;. .. 24
Similar changes have been proposed for the statute governing
federal question venue, in that the "residence" of corporate defen-
dants is modified in the same manner, and the phrase "where the
claim arose" is expanded to include any "substantial part".2 The
residence of a defendant is still considered proper venue, but if
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1948).
21. It is estimated that 45.3% of all original diversity actions would be excluded from
the federal courts by the new provision, proposed § 1302(a). American Law Institute Study
of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 1965, Commentary to § 1302, 69, n. 12 (hereinafter cited as A.L.I. STUDY).
22. Id. at 69.
23. Id.
24. A.L.I. STUDY, proposed § 1303(a)(1) at 14 (emphasis added).
25. American Law Institute Study for the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts, Tentative Draft No. 6, 1968, proposed § 1314.
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there are multiple defendants, all must reside in the same state
(rather than the same district, as is presently the case). The most
striking change is the addition in the most recent tentative draft
of subsection (c); this subsection provides that service of process
upon any defendant in civil actions may be made in any district,
when a federal question is involved. The Reporters stated the rea-
son for these alterations:
Existing rules as to venue and service of process in federal ques-
tion cases often prevent a suit from being heard in the most
convenient forum, and on occasion may bar access to a federal
court altogether. Changes are proposed to meet these difficul-
ties."6
Although these changes in the federal venue statutes are mere
proposals not yet enacted into law, they indicate awareness of the
need to reduce forum-shopping, while simultaneously maintaining
access to the federal courts in those cases properly entitled to such
access.
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938
and their subsequent modifications have been aimed at simplifying
procedure and eliminating inequities which could result from the
old rules. Law and equity were merged in Federal practice at last;27
specific provision was made for the transfer of cases laid in impro-
per venues;21 and the doctrine of forum non conveniens29 was ex-
pressly recognized.
The development of interstate commerce, the emerging import-
ance of corporations in the lives of state citizens, improvements in
methods of transportation, and the dominance of automobiles
made adaptations in the state court systems necessary also. As the
isolated and rural character of the nation changed, the states found
that the interests of their citizens were more frequently affected by
individuals and corporations outside the jurisdiction of the individ-
ual states. In order to give the citizens of a particular state the
protection of its courts, "long arm" statutes were enacted; these
laws are designed to subject non-residents and foreign corporations
to the jurisdiction of the courts within the state enacting such a
statute. Special licensing and regulating statutes for foreign corpo-
rations, such as insurance companies and railroads, were passed;
26. Id. at 2, n. 25.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1406)a) (1948).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948).
19721
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
and the concepts of "presence", "consent", and "doing business"
developed as authority for subjecting non-resident individuals and
foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of state courts." Fre-
quently, special venue provisions were enacted to be applied in such
cases, which often further complicated the original venue
provisions.
This, then, is the composition of venue provisions today-a
mixture of the traditional English venue rules, the American adap-
tations with their emphasis on the protection of defendants, and the
special provisions and exceptions made necessary by time and cir-
cumstances.3 1 As defined in a recent law review article, "(T)he
major purpose of venue is to provide a fair and convenient geo-
graphical location for trial within the borders of a jurisdiction,
usually a State, in which jurisdiction over the defendant or his
property has been acquired. While convenience to defendant rather
than plaintiff is usually emphasized, and while the location of wit-
nesses-the place where the cause of action arises-may also be
an important factor, there are few limitations on the locations
which a legislature may establish as proper venues. '"32
III. VENUE IN WISCONSIN
Interest in legal reform reached a peak during the middle of the
nineteenth century. In England, this was reflected in the Hilary
rules of 1834; the rigidity of these rules was subsequently modified
by the Judicature Act of 1870 and the Law Reform Act of 1873.
In the United States, the major work of reform was undertaken
by David Dudley Field, an attorney in New York. Field had long
been interested in codifying the law on a national level, but was
unable to arouse sufficient support. When New York began to take
an interest in such a project, Field was a willing worker. New York
was in need of reform because its first Constitution, adopted in
1777, declared the law of the State to consist of the common law
of England as it was in force in New York in 1775, together with
the acts of the Colonial legislature and the new state of New York
30. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); and Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 III. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).'
31. Proper venue may be affected also by the character of the action, problems of party-
joinder and claim-joinder, the reach of process, and jurisdiction of persons and subject-
matter.
32. Miller, Implementing Current Theories of Jurisdiction, Venue and Service of
Process, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 116, 119 (1968).
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then in force.3 Subsequent modifications and adaptations had
only complicated the system's inherent defects.34 Field's work pro-
duced the five Field Codes, the best known of which was the Code
of Civil Procedure.
Similar experiences in other states made many of them recep-
tive to New York's lead in adopting the Code of Civil Procedure
in 1848; ultimately thirty jurisdictions adopted this Code, with
Wisconsin among the first to do so. A comparison of sections 616,
617 and 618 of the Field Code35 with section 261.0136 of the
Wisconsin Statutes shows a substantial identity of provisions, with
the exception of later additions, such as those governing venue in
motor vehicle accident cases.
That the fundamental venue in Wisconsin is the residence of the
33. N.Y. CONST. art. XXXV (1777).
34. ALISON REPPY, The Field Codification Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTE-
NARY ESSAYS 18, 24-25 (1949).
35. The Interpretative Commentary in the Wis. STAT. ANNOT. § 261.01 (1969) states:
This section came initially from sections 616, 617, and 618 of the Field Code,
although R.S. 1858, c. 123 §§ 1-5 covered more situations than those mentioned in
§§ 616, 617 and 618, viz. actions against a county and against corporations. R.S.
1878, § 2619 shows the addition of specific subsections for marriage actions and
railroad actions.
36. WIs. STAT. § 261.01 (1969) reads in part as follows:
PLACE OF TRIAL. Except as provided in section 220.12 and subject to the
provisions for change of venue the proper place of trial of civil action is as follows:
(1) WHERE SUBJECT OF ACTION SITUATED. Of an action within one of the four
classes next following, the county in which the subject of the action or some part
thereof is situated, viz.: (a) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or
interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such estate or interest, or
for an injury to real property. (b) For the partition of property. (c) For the foreclo-
sure, redemption or other satisfaction of a mortgage of real property. (d) For the
recovery of distrained personal property ....
(2) WHERE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES. ...
(4) ACTION AGAINST RAILROADS. ...
(5) AGAINST INSURANCE COMPANIES . ...
(6) AGAINST OTHER CORPORATIONS. Of an action against any other corporation
the county in which it has its principal office or in which the cause of action or some
part thereof arose.
(8) ACTIONS BY STATE. ...
(9) ACTIONS AGAINST THE STATE. ...
(10) ACTIONS ON OFFICIAL BONDS. ...
(11) AUTO ACCIDENT ACTIONS. Of an action growing out of the negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle, the county in which the cause of action arose or where the
defendant resides.
(I I b) ASSAULT AND BATTERY ACTIONS ....
(12) OTHER ACTIONS. Of any other action, the county in which any defendant
resides at the commencement of the action; or if no defendant resides in this state,
any county which the plaintiff designates in his complaint.
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defendant, or the principal office within the state in the case of a
corporate defendant, is apparent from section 261.01(12). 31 All
other provisions are exceptions, in whole or in part, to this general
rule.3 Hence, the defendant's residence or principal office is either
the only proper place of trial, or a possible alternate venue in seven
of the eleven subsections. In addition, subsection (4) which applies
to actions against railroads allows the action to be brought where
the cause of action arose or the plaintiff resides, but only if the
railroad line extends into such county; otherwise, the action must
be brought in a county into which the track does extend. Thus the
place of defendant's residence or principal office is proper venue,
with the limited specific exceptions of the various subsections for:
"local actions"; actions against public officers or to recover statu-
tory penalties or forfeitures; actions by the State; and actions on
official bonds. Of these exceptions, the subsection providing for
venue only in the county where the "subject of the action" is situ-
ated3" has proved to be the most difficult to interpret. It is not
always easy to determine which actions are "local" and therefore
must be laid "where the subject of the action" is situated. The
correct resolution of this problem is all the more important since
a judgment in a local action obtained in the wrong county is void
for lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter."
Venue provisions based on "where the cause of action or some
part thereof arose" have led to litigation due to the difficulty in
defining "cause of action" and "part thereof";4 this occurs most
frequently when a defendant attempts to change venue to his resi-
dence or place of business, after the plaintiff has commenced the
action in another county on the grounds that the cause of action
or some part of it arose there. The general rule is well-settled that,
when alternative places of trial are available, the plaintiff's choice
will not be disturbed unless the defendant is able to show that the
county selected is improper.4" Only in the occasional case where the
37. Id.
38. For a detailed analysis of all the statutes governing venue in Wisconsin, see Com-
ment, Venue in Civil Actions in Wisconsin, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 663.
39. Wis. STAT. § 261.01 (1969).
40. See State ex rel. Hammer v. Williams, 209 Wis. 541, 245 N.W. 663 (1932), which
held that a court without jurisdiction of the subject-matter is without the power to give a
judgment.
41. The phrase appears in six of the eleven subsections of WIs. STAT. § 261.01.
42. Woodward v. Hanchett, 52 Wis. 482, 9'N.W. 468 (1881); Dells Paper & Pulp Co.
v. Willow River Lumber Co., 170 Wis. 19, 173 N.W. 317 (1919); State ex rel. Flambeau
River Lumber Co. v. Reid, 206 Wis. 478, 240 N.W. 149 (1933).
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court, in its discretion, consents to apply section 261.04(2)"3 and
order a change of venue to promote the convenience of witnesses
and the ends of justice will a proper place of trial chosen by the
plaintiff be changed."
IV. "LOCAL ACTIONS" IN WISCONSIN
Early in Wisconsin's history, just before adoption of the Code,
proper venue for actions involving real estate was called into ques-
tion in Burrall v. Eames." The plaintiff brought a bill for specific
performance of a contract for the sale of land in Rock County. The
defendant was served in Brown County where he resided. Relying
on a statutory provision that "no person shall be sued. . . in any
other county than the one in which he resides, or in which he may
be found", the defendant asserted that the Rock County court had
not acquired personal jurisdiction over him, a plea which the lower
court sustained.
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that process
in equity ran throughout the realm in England, and that in New
York a bill was filed with the chancellor or the clerk of a circuit
without reference to the defendant's residence." The court pro-
ceeded to hold that the statute relied on was applicable only to
personal actions at law, and was not pertinent to equitable actions.
It therefore reversed the order.of the trial court, and ruled that
valid personal jurisdiction had been acquired, in accordance with
the common usage of the courts of chancery. In discussing the
nature of a suit for specific performance of a contract to convey
land, the court said:
(A) suit for specific performance, like that of foreclosure, is of a
two-fold character, partly in personam and partly in rem. The
Court may enforce the contract, either by operating upon the
person to compel a conveyance, or may pass the title of the land
by decree. . . . (A)s the sole object of the suit to subject the
specific property to the jurisdiction of the court, the county in
which it is situated is the proper county in which to commence
the suit, although the defendant may reside in another county in
the state. 7
43. This is the Wisconsin statutory recognition of the doctrine offorum non conveniens.
44. See the review of cases in State ex rel. Meyer v. Park, 174 Wis. 452, 183 N.W. 165
(1921).
45. Burrall v. Eames, 5 Wis. 260 (1856).
46. Id. at 262.
47. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
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The court thus ruled that the "sole object of the suit" (jurisdic-
tion over the subject-matter) required laying venue in the county
where the land was located. Despite the equitable nature of the
remedy sought and the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant-the type of jurisdiction equity traditionally re-
quires-the action was held to be local.4 8
Shortly after Burrall v. Eames, the Code provisions were en-
acted, in words nearly identical to those of the present statute,
section 261.01(1), making venue mandatory in the county where
the subject of the action is located.
In 1875, a related problem arose in Hackett v. Carter," when
the plaintiff sought cancellation of a deed to property in Jackson
County, and an order compelling the defendant to reconvey the
land. In the same action, an order was also sought to compel the
defendant to reconvey other land in Eau Claire County, on the
ground of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by the defendant.
The defendant's demurrer based upon improper joinder of causes
of action was sustained, because the location of the two parcels of
land would require different places of trial. The court said:
(T)hat these causes of action are local and properly triable in the
county where the different tracts are situated, does not admit of
doubt . . . it is clear the circuit court of Eau Claire County has
no right to try the first cause of action . . ..
The issue involved in the court's holding was, of course, whether
the causes of action could be properly joined; however, it is appar-
ent that again the situs of the different tracts was of paramount
importance in rejecting such joinder even though equity could tra-
ditionally compel a defendant, over whom personal jurisdiction
had been acquired, to affect the title of land not within the jurisdic-
tion of the court.-1 This holding is therefore contrary to the general
48. See also 92 C.J.S., Venue § 26 at 724, which states:
[I]f title is principally involved or if the judgment or decree operates directly
and primarily on the estate or title, and not alone in personam against the parties,
the action will be held local.
Note may be taken of Wisconsin Revised Statutes of 1849, ch. 59, § 30, which defined
"conveyance" as
every instrument in writing, by which any estate or interest in real estate is created,
aliened, mortgaged or assigned, or by which the title to any real estate may be
affected in law or equity, except wills, leases for a term not exceeding three years,
and executory contracts for the sale or purchase of lands. (emphasis added).
49. 38 Wis. 394 (1875).
50. Id. at 398 f.
51. 49 AM. JUR. Specific Performance § 140 (1943).
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rule that actions seeking cancellation or rescission of contracts to
convey land are transitory and in personam. 2
In McArthur v. Moffet, 3 a question of misjoinder of two
causes of action elicited further comments by the court in an effort
to clarify the phrase "subject of action" which has appeared in the
Wisconsin Statutes since the adoption of the Code." The defendant
demurred to the joinder of a legal cause of action for damages for
trespass and cutting timber with an equitable "quiet-title" action.
Though both actions fall within the provisions of section
261.01(l)(a) and are therefore "local" in nature, it was necessary
to determine whether they arose out of "transactions connected
with the same subject of action". 5 In an extensive and detailed
opinion, the meaning of "subject of action" as it applies to the
foundation for proper venue was discussed. The court concluded
that
...in possessory and proprietary actions (that is, actions in-
volving rights of possession and ownership), whether involving
real or personal property, the subject of action is composed of
the plaintiffs primary right together with the specific property
itself."
This statement allows room for speculation as to whether local
actions which must be brought "where the subject of action or
some part thereof is situated, ' 57 could be brought in a county other
than that in which the land is located if the plaintiff resides in that
other county, since his personal rights or claims could be said to
follow him-a concept which would seem to eliminate all local
actions except those in which an in rem judgment is sought.
More recently, an action seeking specific performance of an
option contract to convey real estate was brought by the State in
the county of the defendants' residence, rather than in the county
in which the real estate was located. 8 It was held that such an
action was a contract action, rather than a "local action" governed
by section 261.01(1) in which the subject-matter was land. The
statutory provision was construed to include only actions for the
52. See Annot., 77 A.L.R. 2d 1014 (1959).
53. 143 Wis. 564, 128 N.W. 445 (1910).
54. Wis. STAT. § 261.01(l) (1969).
55. Wis. STAT. § 2647 §§ 1 (1898).
56. 143 Wis. at 588, 128 N.W. at 454.
57. Wis. STAT. § 261.01(l) (1969) (emphasis added).
58. State v. Conway, 26 Wis. 2d 410, 132 N.W.2d 539 (1965).
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"recovery of real property", not those in which the plaintiff sought
to acquire title. Thus, "recovery" is the key word. The court stated
that the action was to enforce the contract rather than to try title,
and that no previous decisions in this state require that an action
to enforce an underlying contract must be commenced under sec-
tion 261.0 1(1). In addition, the fact that the judgment would oper-
ate in personam, rather than directly upon the land, was given as
a reason for holding that the action was properly brought within
the county of the defendants' residence, pursuant to section
261.01(12).
It is difficult to reconcile this ruling with that in Burrall v.
Eames,59 and other previous actions." The point on which the court
apparently relied most heavily was its interpretation that an essen-
tial element of local actions under section 261.01(1)(a) is the exist-
ence of some prior title or interest which is sought to be recovered.
In "quiet-title" actions, such as McArthur v. Moffet,11 the plaintiff
alleges the existence of his title or interest and seeks to exclude the
defendant's assertion of title. In ejectment actions, a present pos-
sessory interest or title is a necessary allegation in the Complaint;
therefore, this is also an action in which the plaintiff asserts the
existence of his title and seeks to recover the possession of real
property to which he has a claim. Even cases such as Hackett v.
Carter" are local because founded upon recovery of title previously
held by the plaintiff but allegedly passed because of fraudulent
misrepresentations. The court's ruling in Conway may be ex-
plained on the basis that an option contract to sell land does not
create any present interest in land so as to require venue within the
county where the land is located. This is quite different from a valid
executory contract to convey land, as in Burrell v. Eames, which
did create a present interest in property. Hence, an action founded
upon the latter can be brought only as a "local action" to protect
that previously existing interest. Since Burrall v. Eames was de-
cided before the enactment of the Code provision construed here,
and therefore was not based precisely upon this wording, it is
possible that the court felt it was unnecessary to consider that
decision, even though it has never been expressly overruled.
59. 5 Wis. 260 (1856).
60. Hacket v. Carter, 38 Wis. 394 (1875); McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N.W.
445 (1910).
61. 143 Wis. 564, 128 N.W. 445 (1910).
62. 38 Wis. 394 (1875).
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In a vigorous dissent from the part of the majority opinion in
Conway which held the action transitory," Justice Beilfuss based
his arguments primarily on the relief sought by the plaintiff, which
he noted was very like that sought in an ejectment action,-that
is, possession of the land; this would necessarily require a change
in title as its real purpose.
The Wisconsin provision governing local actions was taken
directly from the New York Code, as amended in 1852, and New
York has recently construed the section to include similar cases.
It should be noted, however, that the New York provision was
amended after 1852,64 and that it now reads:
The place of trial of an action in which the judgment demand
would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of
real property shall be in the county in which any part of the
subject of the action is situated. 5
It may also be noted that an Annotation66 declares:
Since an action to compel specific performance of a contract
pertaining to real property is generally classified as in personam
and transitory, except to the extent that it is sought to recover a
judgment or decree operating directly on the property, the venue
thereof, in the absence of any constitutional or statutory provi-
sion to the contrary, is generally held to be in the county in which
the defendant resides.
Apparently, the rule of Livingston v. Jefferson6 continues, requir-
ing that actions to recover personal judgments for damages to real
property be brought in the county where the property is located.
Yet personal judgments for damages of any other nature-in tort
or contract, for example-clearly are transitory.
In 1967, a similar problem to that in Conway arose in Fond
du Lac Plaza, Inc. v. H. C. Prange Co.,"8 although the fact situation
varied slightly from that in Conway. Plaza was the holder, as
assignee, of an option to lease certain land in Fond du Lac County
from the defendant-owners, Reid. Before the expiration of the op-
tion, the Reids conveyed part of the tract to the defendant, Prange.
63. 26 Wis. 2d at 417-21, 132 N.W. 2d at 543-45.
64. Wisconsin's statute was modelled on the New York provision as it existed in 1852.
65. N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW § 507 (McKinney 1963).
66. Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 456, 479 (1956).
67. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
68. 47 Wis. 2d 593, 178 N.W.2d 67 (1967).
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Plaza then brought suit in Rock County, the county of the Reids'
residence.
The plaintiff sought four specific forms of relief, three of which
were equitable in nature: (1) that the conveyances be set aside and
declared null and void, though subsequently this request was with-
drawn informally by a letter to the trial court; (2) that Prange and
its assignee, Budget, be restrained from exercising any form of
control over the land; (3) that specific performance of the option
contract by the Reids be ordered, and that plaintiffs rights be
declared superior to any purported rights of Prange and Budget;
and (4) money damages for losses due to defendants' refusal to
permit the exercise of the option at the agreed time.
Prange's demurrer, on the grounds that Fond du Lac County
was the only proper county for what it believed to be a local action,
was overruled. On appeal, Prange argued that the action was local,
under section 261.01(1)(a), and that a valid judgment could there-
fore be given only by the Circuit Court of Fond du Lac County.
Prange also stated its concern that a trial and judgment in Rock
County could subsequently be attacked as void for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Such an attack might necessitate a second trial
in Fond du Lac County, causing further expense and inconvenience
to the defendants. It further refused to recognize the plaintiffs
informal withdrawal of paragraph 1 of the Complaint, stating that
paragraphs I and 3 were in essence "quiet-title" actions, and that
the relief sought in paragraph 2 was similar to an action in eject-
ment-both types of relief being traditionally local actions for the
recovery of an interest in land. It was noted that the plaintiff had
filed a lis pendens in Fond du Lac County as required by section
281.03 of the Statutes when a plaintiff "seeks relief in respect to
the title (of land)". Prange sought to distinguish this case from
Conway by emphasizing that here there were third parties involved
(Prange and Budget) who were not privy to the option contract
between the plaintiff and the Reids. These third parties would have
no contract defenses available to them, such as the defendants in
Conway had.
The plaintiff insisted that Conway did apply, and argued that,
after its withdrawl of paragraph 1 of the Complaint, the only relief
sought was contract relief. Its arguments were based on the idea
that, as in Conway, the action was not for recovery of an existing
interest in land, but to acquire one, and that the judgment would
operate only in personam against the Reids. As against Prange, the
plaintiff contended that only ancillary relief was sought, in order
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to make specific performance by the Reids possible by setting aside
the conveyance to Prange. The plaintiff argued that Prange bought
with knowledge of the existing option, and that therefore a con-
structive trust should be imposed in favor of Plaza. Furthermore,
Plaza relied upon State ex rel. Klabacka v. Charles69 for the propo-
sition that protecting defendants from the hardship and inconveni-
ence of defending in a distant county is the real interest with which
the legislature was concerned when it enacted section 261.03 to
allow change of venue to a proper county. Since the Reids' resi-
dence was in the county where the action was brought by the
plaintiff, it could not be an inconvenient county for them, and
venue should not be changed.
The Supreme Court sustained the trial court's decision, and
ruled that section 261.01(l)(a) was intended to apply only when an
in rem judgment is sought, stating:
a suit although involving or concerned with real property
indirectly is not subject to the section when the main object and
nature of the suit is not to directly affect title to land by force of
the decree of the court.70
The court recognized that occasionally a suit for specific perform-
ance may be in rem when the defendant is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or when both the property and the defen-
dant are subject to its jurisdiction, as in Burrall v. Eames,71 but the
relief sought is to affect the land directly. According to the court's
opinion in Plaza, the Burrall suit could have been commenced in
either county, but since the relief sought was in rem, the venue was
fixed by the location of the land and the defendant could not obtain
a change to the county of his residence.
Once the premise is accepted that "local actions" do not in-
clude options to purchase land which may be "recovered", the
court's rulings follow recognized authorities. It is settled law that
a constructive trust may be imposed on co-defendants who are not
privy to a contract if they purchased with notice of the existence
of that contract;72 also that the form of decree, when a vendor has
conveyed to a third party and the vendee seeks specific perform-
ance, should direct the third party to convey the property to the
vendee, rather than order cancellation of the deed and specific
69. 36 Wis. 2d 122, 152 N.W.2d 857 (1967).
70. 47 Wis. 2d at 596, 178 N.W.2d at 69.
71. Burrall v. Eames, 5 Wis. 260 (1856).
72. 49 AM. JUR. § 148, at 171 f.
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performance by the vendor.73 A recent case involving a similar
fact situation in another jurisdiction 74 held that when the relief
sought was specific performance of the option contract by one
defendant and cancellation of the deed conveying the land to the
second defendant, venue was proper in the county of the second
defendant's residence. 75 Other jurisdictions have tended to limit
local actions in recent years, 7 although the change most often
made has been to release trespass to land from the local classifica-
tion, probably because the remedy sought is a personal judgment
against the defendant for money damages.
Apparently, then, in Wisconsin an action involving real prop-
erty must be for the recovery of an existing interest in land in order
to come within the local action category. If a contract is involved,
the wording of the prayer for relief will determine whether the
action is transitory or local, even though both personal jurisdiction
of the defendant and jurisdiction of the subject-matter can be read-
ily obtained in the county where the land is situated. In Plaza, it
is also interesting to reflect on the fact that all defendants wanted
the venue changed to the county where the land was located, and
the plaintiff could have obtained a judgment there which would
unquestionably have been res judicata. It would appear that the
protection of the defendants' interests had to yield before the plain-
tiffs choice of remedy, once the cause of action was established by
the court as transitory. Yet, historically, it was in transitory ac-
tions that the defendant's interest was most protected. There ap-
pears, thus, to be a paradoxical situation when a defendant, in the
protection of his interests, asserts that a suit must be "local", and
a plaintiff, in an effort to buy land on which it had taken an option,
states that the action is not local, but transitory.
V. "CAUSE OF ACTION OR SOME PART THEREOF" IN LAYING
VENUE IN WISCONSIN
It has already been noted that the basic venue is the defendant's
residence, unless altered or varied by specific statutory provisions.
73. 49 AM. JUR. § 176.
74. Gibbons v. Hodges, 222 Ga. 434, 150 S.E.2d 651 (1966).
75. It may be noted, however, that there is a general rule that an action based on privity
of estate is local, and one based on privity of contract is transitory. 92 C.J.S., Venue § 8,
at 679.
76. See Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MICH. L. REV. 307
(1951); see also Comment, Venue-Localizing Transitory Actions in Tennessee Civil
Proceedings, 35 TENN. L. REv. 520 (1968).
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"Where the cause of action arose" is one such specific statutory
modification. This phrase occurs in four of the eleven subsections
of the venue statute, and the phrase "cause of action or some part
thereof" appears in two others. As a result, a clear understanding
of the phrases is of importance in determining proper venue, but
such a definition has proved elusive. The problem is made more
difficult by the fact that venue provisions are purely statutory and
must therefore be strictly followed. 77
Early in Wisconsin's history under the Code, the court held that
a defendant who made a timely and proper statutory demand to
change venue to a proper county, when that originally named in
the complaint was improper, was entitled to the change as a matter
of right, rather than merely at the discretion of the court." It has
also been held that the place of trial will be that named in the
Complaint, unless the defendant moves for a change of
venue,-i.e., the court is not deprived of the power to render a valid
judgment merely because it is not a "proper" court if the defendant
does not object. 79 The sole exception is, of course, in local actions
in which venue becomes jurisdictional in the sense that the court
must have subject-matter jurisdiction to render a valid in rem judg-
ment affecting realty. In transitory actions, however, the defen-
dant's failure to raise the question constitutes a waiver. The power
of a defendant to change the place of trial, when that place is
originally proper, is very limited." A review of a few cases may
illustrate the difficulties which have arisen because of the need to
define "cause of action" and to determine whether the defendant's
right to change venue is absolute or discretionary.
Hosley v. Wisconsin Odd Fellows' Mutual Life Insurance Co."1
was an action to recover proceeds due on a life insurance policy.
The plaintiff-beneficiaries resided in La Crosse and commenced
the suit there; the defendant attempted to change the place of trial
to Milwaukee where it maintained its principal office. According
77. State ex rel. Trost v. Schinz, 217 Wis. 576, 259 N.W. 601 (1935); State ex rel.
Bobroffv. Braun, 209 Wis. 483, 245 N.W. 176 (1932); State ex reL Schauer v. Risjord, 183
Wis. 553, 198 N.W. 273 (1924).
78. Foster v. Bacon, 9 Wis. 345 (1859); Rines v. Boyd, 7 Wis. 155 (1859).
79. Dells Paper & Pulp Co. v. Willow River Lumber Co., 170 Wis. 19, 173 N.W. 317
(1919).
80. Generally, such a change can be based upon a showing that: (1) a change would
serve the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice; (2) that he cannot receive an im-
partial trial in that county; (3) that the parties have agreed to the change; or (4) that another
case is pending with which this one may be consolidated. Wis. STAT. § 261.04 (1969).
81. 86 Wis. 463, 57 N.W. 48 (1893).
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to the statute, proper venue included both the county of defen-
dant's office and the county or counties in which the cause of action
or a part thereof had arisen.8" Obviously, Milwaukee was a proper
place of venue, but the court restated the general rule that, if the
county chosen by the plaintiff was also a proper place, the defen-
dant had no absolute right to the change. Necessarily a determina-
tion of the propriety of La Crosse involved a determination of the
constituent parts of the cause of action. The court initially recog-
nized that the cause of action includes ". . . the act or omission
without which there would be no cause of action or right of recov-
ery. ' '83 Because the failure to pay the proceeds to the beneficiaries
within 90 days was the omission complained of, and since such
payment was to have been made at the residence of the beneficiar-
ies, this omission made La Crosse a proper place of trial and the
defendant's motion was consequently denied.
Anderson v. Arpin Hardwood Lumber Co. 4 affirmed several
aspects of the law governing change of venue. The defendant-
corporation sought to remove the action from Eau Claire to Wood
County, but failed to state clearly in its demand that the original
county named was improper and also failed to specify all the pro-
per counties to which the action might be removed. The court
reiterated its position that removal is not mandatory if the original
venue is proper. When the original venue is improper, the court
held that ". . . the prime essential to a compulsory change of the
place of trial (is) . . . a statutory demand." 5 Without a properly
worded demand which would give the plaintiff and the court all the
necessary information as to all proper counties, the plaintiff need
not respond and no legitimate basis for a motion to the court for
removal has been laid.
Further clarification of the rule that the place of trial is that in
which the plaintiff lays the action in his Complaint, absent a de-
mand for change by the defendant, appeared in State ex rel. Meyer
v. Park."8 The plaintiff, Bean, had brought an action in Wood
County seeking to recover on two promissory notes; the defendant
served a statutory demand for removal to Barron County, his resi-
dence. He also answered and counter-claimed, requesting a set-off,
without denying the debts alleged in the Complaint. The trial court
82. WIs. STAT. § 261.01(5) (1969).
83. 86 Wis. at 466, 57 N.W. at 49.
84. 131 Wis. 34, 110 N.W. 788 (1907).
85. 131 Wis. at 39, 110 N.W. at 791.
86. 174 Wis. 452, 183 N.W. 165 (1921).
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denied the'defendant's demand, reasoning that since the only facts
in issue were the allegations of the counter-claim, the defendant
had thereby become the plaintiff and the plaintiff the defendant as
to the issues for trial; therefore Wood County, the residence of the
party transformed into the defendant by the counterclaim, was
proper. The Supreme Court made quite clear its view that the
counterclaim was not a new action but merely a pleading in the
original action, even though a complete cause of action was stated
in the counterclaim. Since the only proper venue was the county
in which the original defendant resided,87 his statutory demand
made his right to change of venue absolute. 8  The rule in Stahl v.
Broekertl9 was quoted with approval by the court:
The statute prescribes the proper place of trial. When an action
is commenced in an improper county it is in defiance of statutory
provisions. The plaintiff has no right to have the action tried
therein unless the right to have it tried in some proper county is
waived by defendants through failure timely to take the necessary
steps to have the place of trial changed. If any of the defendants
demand that the action be tried in the proper county the plaintiff
is in no position to object. He should have brought the action in
the proper county in the first instance. He should not be permit-
ted to profit by his disregard of statutory requirements and force
a trial of the action in an improper county against the demand
of any of the defendants that the action be had in the proper
county. In other words, the statute fixes the proper place of trial,
and any defendant has a right to have the action tried in some
proper county, even though such right be not insisted upon or,
for that matter, desired by all of the defendants.
A subsequent case necessitated a definition of the constituent
parts of a cause of action for breach of contract. In State ex rel.
Webster v. Risjord,90 the plaintiff brought its action in Price
County where its branch office was located and where it accepted
the defendant's orders. In addition, the lumber was shipped from
Price County. The plaintiff also contended that payment was due
there, although the contract itself was silent as to the place of
payment. The plaintiff's principal office was in Wood County. The
87. Wis. STAT. § 261.01(12) (1969).
88. The question of forum non conveniens was also raised by the plaintiff, Bean; how-
ever, the court, in dismissing this contention, stated that proper venue was a prerequisite to
any consideration of convenience.
89. 167 Wis. 113, 117, 166 N.W. 653, 654 (1918).
90. 201 Wis. 26, 229 N.W. 61 (1930).
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defendant moved to change venue to Douglas County, the site of
its principal office; the defendant also contended that a prior
course of dealing made Douglas County the place of payment. The
court reaffirmed the rule that the place of payment is the residence
or principal office of the seller, when the contract itself does not
name the place of payment; however, whether the place of payment
was to be Wood or Douglas County was held to be unimportant,
since Price County would still be a proper place if a part of the
cause of action arose there. Citing McArthur v. Moffet,9" the cause
of action was held to consist of two basic parts-the plaintiff's
rights and the defendant's violation of those rights. Since the con-
tract was made in Price County, the plaintiff's rights arose there,
and Price was therefore held to be a proper county. Thus, the
defendant had no absolute right to change. The court stated:
92
. . . (W)e hold that such rights (i.e., the rights of the plaintiff
under the contract) constitute a part of the cause of action, within
the meaning of the statute fixing the place of trial of the action.
The court ruled similarly" in a fact-situation very like that in
Webster, on the basis that the plaintiff's rights under the contract,
the place of payment, and the place of performance all were in
Lincoln County, so venue could not be changed by the defendant
as a matter of right. The defendant asserted that the contract was
made at its own principal office since final modifications of the
contract were made there;94 however, the court stated that this,
even if true, would not affect the fact that some parts of the cause
of action arose in Lincoln County and venue was therefore proper.
The "place of payment" rule received another twist in State ex
rel. Connor Lumber & Land Co. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee
County.9 5 The plaintiff sought to recover on a mortgage bond,
naming both the mortgagor and the guarantor as defendants, both
of which were corporations having their principal offices in Wood
County. In this case, the bond itself gave the holder the option of
demanding payment in either Milwaukee or Chicago; payment had
been demanded in Chicago and refused, before the action was
91. McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N.W. 445 (1910).
92. 201 Wis. at 29, 229 N.W. at 62.
93. State ex rel. Flambeau River Lumber Co. v. Reid, 206 Wis. 478, 240 N.W. 149
(1932).
94. 92 C.J.S., Venue § 10, at 683, states that the general rule is that the contract is
made where the primary agreement is made and is not affected by subsequent modifications.
95. 213 Wis. 141, 250&N.W. 753 (1933).
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brought. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had made an
election by seeking payment in Chicago and that consequently
Milwaukee was no longer a possible place of payment, thereby
making Milwaukee improper as a place for trial. The court did not
agree that, by unsuccessfully seeking payment in Chicago, the
plaintiff had lost its right to payment in Milwaukee; thus, part of
the cause of action, the plaintiff's right to payment, still existed in
Milwaukee and made venue in that county proper.
An interesting case, from several points of view, arose from an
automobile accident in which the plaintiffs received personal inju-
ries.96 The plaintiffs brought the action against the insurance com-
pany, as permitted under Wisconsin's "direct action" statute,9 7 in
Oneida County, where they resided. The accident had occurred in
Vilas County, where the driver, Jackson, resided; however, the
plaintiffs did not name Jackson as a defendant and sought no
judgment against him since he was a minor without means. The
defendant-insurance company failed to make timely demand for
removal to a proper county as required.98 Apparently realizing its
error, it obtained permission from the court in Oneida County to
implead Jackson, who then had an opportunity to demand removal
to Vilas County. In an excellent opinion, the court stated:
The purpose and object of the instant statutes plainly are to
provide that a defendant whose interests will be affected by the
trial of a case shall be given the right to have it tried in a county
designated by the statutes as a 'proper' place of trial. The statutes
are aimed at protection of pecuniary, property, and proprietary
interests. It would be absurd and unreasonable to assume that the
legislature intended that a person who had no interest that could
be affected by the event of an action should be given the right to
control its place of trial.99
The Supreme Court was obviously annoyed at the attempt of the
insurance company to circumvent the statute by impleading Jack-
son, particularly in view of the assurances given the Oneida Court
to the.effect that joining Jackson would not delay trial. Dismissing
the defendant's argument that the right to change the place of trial
is not affected by any other proceedings in the action,10 the court
commented that
96. State ex rel. Jackson v. Leicht, 231 Wis. 178, 285 N.W. 335 (1939).
97. Wis. STAT. § 260.11 (1969).
98. Wis. STAT. § 261.03 (1969).
99. 231 Wis. at 185, 285 N.W. at 338.
100. Wis. STAT. § 261.03 (1969).
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. . .what has deprived the insurance company of right to change
of venue is not any proceeding, but want of a proceeding by it
under the statute that confers the right within the time allowed
thereby for asserting the right.' 01
Another automobile accident case further delineated the venue
rights of co-defendants. State ex rel. Boyd v. Aarons02 established
the principle that, if venue is well-founded as to one defendant, in
a case involving multiple defendants, the other defendants are not
entitled to demand a change of venue. The action was brought in
Milwaukee County, where the defendant-insurance company had
its principal office; the court ruled that the defendant-driver had
no absolute right to demand a change of venue to Washington
County where he resided and where the accident had occurred.
Recently, the court allowed a change of venue, in an apparent
relaxation of the rule laid down in Anderson,0 3 which required
strict compliance with statutory requirements in a demand for
change of venue; however, the court stated:
(W)e do not consider this holding a departure from previous
mandates of this court which have emphasized that the essential
prerequisite for a change of venue be that the plaintiff have
knowledge of the controlling facts.'04
That is, the defendant must state that venue is improper and spec-
ify the proper counties. Perhaps the court was influenced by its
statement of the general purpose of the statutes:
The purpose of secs. 261.03 and 261.01(12), Stats., is to prevent
the hardship and inconvenience to which a defendant may be
subjected by having to defend himself in a county in which he is
not a resident." 5
In 1969, an action on a contract, State ex rel. Hartwig's Poul-
try Farm, Inc. v. Bunde,"° raised some question as to how well-
settled the rules governing venue in contract actions actually are.
In the underlying action, a poultry farmer, Victor Heeg, sought
damages of $36,000 and an accounting from the processor, Har-
twig, based on an oral contract by the terms of which Heeg's
101. 231 Wis. at 183, 285 N.W. at 337.
102. 239 Wis. 643, 2 N.W.2d 221 (1942).
103. Anderson v. Arpin Hardwood Lumber Co., 131 Wis. 34, 110 N.W. 788 (1907).
104. State ex rel. Klabacka v. Charles, 36 Wis. 2d 122, 130, 152 N.W.2d 857, 859
(1967).
105. 36 Wis. 2d at 129, 152 N.W.2d at 859.
106. 44 Wis. 2d 229, 170 N.W.2d 734 (1969).
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turkeys were to be processed and sold by Hartwig. A provision was
also included that, in the event Hartwig could not find a third party
buyer, Hartwig would purchase the turkeys at a specified amount
below the market price. The suit, based on Hartwig's alleged fail-
ure to sell all the turkeys or find another buyer promptly, and to
give Heeg all the proceeds due,"7 was brought in Wood County
where Heeg resided. Hartwig then made a demand for change of
venue to Jefferson County, its principal place of business. This
demand the trial court denied, apparently on the basis that part of
the required performance (picking up the turkeys) was in Wood
County, thereby making it a "proper" county under section
261.01(6), Wisconsin Statutes.
On appeal, Hartwig argued that the only possible breaches
alleged must have taken place at its principal place of business
since they amounted to a failure of performance, rather than non-
payment. The defendant also urged that the non-payment cases
which state that part of the cause of action arises where the con-
tract is made, where it is breached, or where payment is to be
made, apply only to contracts for the sale of goods, not to con-
tracts for the performance of services.108
In his affidavit in opposition to Hartwig's motion for change
of venue, Heeg had alleged the contract without detail, except to
state that the payments were to be made in Wood County and not
all payments were made. In his appellate brief, it was argued that
Wood County was a proper county because the cause of action or
a part thereof arose there, since that was where the contract was
made, the payment was to be made, and part of the contract was
to be performed. Anderson"0 9 was cited as authority for the rule
that, when the cause of action does not wholly arise in the defen-
dant's county, change of venue is not an absolute right; and
107. The Complaint set out five causes of action:
1. Hartwig failed to follow instructions and sell all the turkeys at once on the
New York market;
2. Hartwig retained money received for some turkeys sold;
3. Hartwig rendered inaccurate accounts;
4. Hartwig was represented by its authorized agent, C. Hartwig, and was es-
topped to deny his authority; and
5. Hartwig negligently failed to use due diligence in finding a third party buyer,
causing loss to the plaintiff.
108. In addition, Hartwig stated that any delay in disposing of all the turkeys was due
to Heeg's failure to give timely instruction, and that, subsequently, all had been sold and
the money paid to Heeg.
109. Anderson v. Arpin Hardwood Lumber Co., 131 Wis. 34, 110 N.W. 788 (1907).
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Flambeau"' was also cited for the proposition that the place of
payment alone justifies laying venue in that county.
The majority held that the breach alleged was a failure to
perform, and that this failure could only have taken place at the
defendant's place of business, in Jefferson County. The court
stated that, since non-payment was not alleged, and no breach of
performance of the acts to be performed in Wood County was
complained of, the only breach was failure to perform duties in
Jefferson County; the majority therefore held that the plaintiff's
cause of action could arise only in Jefferson County, so that the
defendant's motion for change of venue should have been
granted."'
In a spirited dissent, 12 Justice Hansen stated that venue could
properly be laid, according to prior holdings of the court, where
(1) the contract is made; (2) the contract is breached; or (3) pay-
ment is to be made. He reasoned that the allegations of the second
cause of action, i.e., that the defendant had sold some turkeys and
kept the proceeds without making proper remittance to the plain-
tiff, was a clear non-payment allegation which constituted "some
part" of the cause of action arising in Wood County and justified
making Wood the place of trial.
This case is puzzling in several respects. First, the holdings of
the court in a number of previous cases, notably Webster' 3 and
Flambeau,"' specifically stated that "the rights of a plaintiff aris-
ing from a contract" are part of any cause of action for breach of
that contract. Yet, here, the majority stated:
We think the second factor (where the acceptance of the contract
takes place) has no significance in this case since there is no
110. State ex rel. Flambeau River Lumber Co. v. Reid, 206 Wis. 478, 240 N.W. 149
(1932).
111. It may be noted, also, that the defendant had attempted at the trial court level to
obtain the desired change of venue through § 261.04(2) which allows changes when the
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted. Evidently, he discontin-
ued this effort on appeal because of the highly discretionary nature of the provision. The
Supreme Court's ruling does not mention this, however, and the relative infrequency with
which the courts grant such motions makes it unlikely that many defendants will be able to
obtain a change of forum through the use of this remedy. See the discussion in State ex rel
Meyer v. Park, 174 Wis. 452, 455-56, 183 N.W. 165, 167-68 (1921).
112. 44 Wis. 2d at 237-39, 170 N.W.2d at 738 f (1969).
113. State ex rel. Webster v. Risjord, 201 Wis. 26, 229 N.W. 61 (1930).




dispute about the making of the contract, and it, therefore, does
not matter where the contract was made.115
Evidently, the two parties disputed which one had accepted the
offer made by the other; however, if Heeg accepted, the contract
was made in Wood County, and his rights under the contract arose
there. It would appear essential to determine whether or not the
contract was made in Wood County, before it could be determined
that no part of Heeg's cause of action for breach of that contract
arose in Wood County.
Secondly, the contract provided for alternative performances
by Hartwig as to the purchase of the birds; it was to find a third
party buyer, or to buy them itself. The court stated"' that, since
failure to find a third party buyer must have preceded the failure
to purchase, only the first failure was charged. This formed the
basis for the rationale that non-payment was not involved. How-
ever, since Hartwig could perform its part of the bargain by doing
either of these, it would seem that failure to buy and pay for the
birds is the ultimate breach of the contract terms, since the failure
to find another purchaser could be readily cured by the alternative
performance.
It had appeared from previous cases that the trend of the hold-
ings had been to increase possible venues by splitting up a cause
of action into "parts thereof", thereby decreasing the extent to
which defendants might be protected from hardship and inconveni-
ence by the venue statutes. Such protection was held to be the
purpose of the statutes; yet the effect of the court's rulings, whether
intentional or not, was often to decrease that protection. However,
in Hartwig, the defendant was granted the sought-after change of
venue, through a process of confining the cause of action on the
contract to the narrow limits of the precise portions of perform-
ance alleged to have been breached, and then considering only the
default, rather than the rights of the plaintiff violated thereby. It
is possible that the majority's ruling resulted from a failure to
allege non-payment with sufficient clarity in the complaint, al-
though the dissent disagreed sharply on this point. Alternatively,
the holding in this case may signal a changing emphasis on the
respective venue rights of defendants and plaintiffs.
115. 44 Wis. 2d 229, 233 f., 170 N.W.2d 734, 736 (1969).




Obviously, much of the difficulty with venue statutes today is
a legacy from the past. Early limitations of locality, scope of pro-
cess, jurisdiction and other more pragmatic considerations survive,
long after the reasons for this existence have largely, if not wholly,
vanished. The basic venue statutes derived from English and early
American law have been overlaid with additions designed to deal
with certain types of parties or particular situations, so that proper
venue may depend on who the parties are, as well as where they
are, and what they are alleged to have done. As a result, venue
statutes today are a "crazy quilt," designed to be fair to everyone
and often ending by pleasing no one.
Originally evolved to serve in situations involving only one
plaintiff, one defendant and a single issue, the venue statutes breed
confusion when applied to modern multiple-party litigation. Cer-
tainly, a defendant's residence should be a convenient and fair
place of trial as to that defendant; however, if other defendants are
included in the action, convenience may dictate a different place
of trial for each of them. Alternatively, the theory on which the
plaintiff bases his claim may result in a particular venue being
either proper or improper, as the preceding contract cases amply
demonstrate.
Venue in the place where a claim arises may be subject to
similar objections, when one considers that the basic function of
venue statutes is to set a fair and convenient location for trial. The
process of splintering a cause of action into its component parts
does offer more opportunities to find a proper venue which is also
a convenient one. Simultaneously, it gives rise to problems in de-
fining those components. This is further complicated when it is
charged that an act has been omitted rather than performed. Venue
might then be proper in any jurisdiction, since an omission "oc-
curs", if it can be said to "occur" at all, everywhere. Such a
solution as a means of determining where trial should be had is not
helpful, to say the least.
It is suggested that the main purpose in having any venue stat-
ute at all is to promote convenience. The paramount importance
of convenience to witnesses was recognized as long ago as 1803;"1
yet the venue statutes today give the barest recognition to this
purpose. The proliferation of possible venues is apt to result in a
117. See note 8 supra.
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venue which is convenient for one party, and inconvenient for an-
other, with forum-shopping as an inevitable result. It seems anom-
alous to require strict observance of formalities before venue can
be changed to promote convenience, when a change of forum
should be obtainable all the more readily when it is truly
inconvenient.
A proper place of trial should not be confused with jurisdic-
tional requirements, as has often happened in the past. Although
a court lacking jurisdiction of a person or of the subject-matter
cannot render a binding judgment, this is a separate consideration
from that of the fairness and the convenience of that forum for all
those involved in the litigation.
It is further submitted that the ends of justice would be better
promoted by giving the courts a free rein to balance the relative
conveniences of all concerned in a lawsuit; then, if the result of such
a balancing test so indicates, those courts should be encouraged to
apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens with increased liberal-
ity. Obviously, such flexibility precludes the use of the old, rigid
approach to venue. However, the reasons for and the feasibility of
such an approach have been superseded by the complex face often
presented by litigation today. A frank recognition of the real justi-
fication for venue statutes requires such a flexible approach, rather
than the superimposition of more patchwork on the existing crazy
quilt.
SHIRLEY M. SORTOR
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